转载——基辛格：乌克兰危机如何收场
2022-02-28 07:14 | 出处： 但斌
作者 l 基辛格（Henry Kissinger）
本文发表于2014年3月6日《华盛顿邮报》
翻译 l 洪灝
转载来源 | 长平经研
关于乌克兰的公开讨论都是关于对抗的。然而，我们知道路向何方吗？在我的一生中，我看到的四场战争，都以极大的热情和公众的支持开始。我们并不知道如何结束所有这些战争，我们单方面撤出了其中三场战争。对政策的考验，是它如何结束，而不是如何开始。
乌克兰问题常常是一种摊牌的姿态：乌克兰是加入东方，还是西方？但是，如果乌克兰要生存和繁荣，它绝不能成为任何一方对抗另一方的前哨——它应该充当它们之间的桥梁。
俄罗斯必须承认，试图迫使乌克兰进入卫星国地位，从而再次移动俄罗斯的边界，将使莫斯科注定要重蹈覆辙，进入与欧美相互施压、自我实现的死循环。
西方必须明白，对俄罗斯而言，乌克兰永远不可能只是一个外国。俄国历史开始于被称为基辅罗斯的地方，俄罗斯宗教从那里传播开来。几个世纪以来，乌克兰一直是俄罗斯的一部分，在此之前，它们的历史就交织在一起。从 1709 年的波尔塔瓦战役开始，俄罗斯争取自由的一些最重要的战役，都是在乌克兰领土上进行的。
黑海舰队——俄罗斯在地中海
欧盟必须认识到，在乌克兰与欧洲关系的谈判中，欧盟官僚作风拖沓，战略因素从属于国内政治，导致谈判演变成危机。外交政策是一门强调先后有别、轻重有分的艺术。
乌克兰人是决定性因素。他们生活在一个历史复杂、通晓多种语言的国家。1939 年，乌克兰西线部分并入苏联，成为斯大林和希特勒瓜分的战利品。克里米亚 60 ％的人口是俄罗斯人，直到 1954 年，乌克兰出生的尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫在庆祝俄罗斯与哥萨克达成协议 300 周年之际，才将克里米亚纳入乌克兰版图。乌克兰西部大部分是天主教徒，而东部大部分则是俄罗斯东正教。
西乌克兰人说乌克兰语，而东乌克兰人主要说俄语。乌克兰的任何一方试图支配另一方——这一直是一种惯用模式——将最终导致内战或分裂。将乌克兰视为东西方对抗的一部分，将使俄罗斯和西方——尤其是俄罗斯和欧洲进入一个合作性国际体系的前景在数十年内化为泡影。
乌克兰独立只有 23 年，从 14 世纪开始就一直处于某种外国统治之下。毫不奇怪，它的领导人没有学会妥协的艺术，更不用说历史的视角了。独立后的乌克兰政治清楚地表明，问题的根源在于乌克兰政治家试图将自己的意愿强加于该国的顽抗地区，先是一派，然后是其对立派。
这是亚努科维奇和他的主要政治对手季莫申科之间冲突的实质。他们代表着乌克兰的两翼，并不愿意分享权力。一个明智的美国对乌克兰政策，是需要寻求一种让乌克兰的两个部分相互合作的方式。我们应该寻求和解，而不是一个派别的统治。
俄罗斯和西方，尤其是乌克兰的所有派别，都没有按照这一原则行事。每一个派别都使情况变得更糟。在俄罗斯的许多边界已经岌岌可危的时候，如果不统一自己，俄罗斯就无法强行实施军事解决办法。对西方来说，妖魔化普京不是一种政策，而是一种缺失的借口。
普京应该意识到，不管他有什么不满，军事强加政策都会导致另一场冷战。就美国而言，它需要避免把俄罗斯当作一个不正常的国家，耐心地接受华盛顿制定的行为准则。普京是一个严肃的战略家——以俄罗斯历史为前提。理解美国的价值观和心理学不是他的强项。了解俄罗斯历史和心理也不是美国决策者的强项。
各方领导人都应该重新审视结果，而不是在摆姿态方面相互竞争。以下是我对于符合各方价值观和安全利益的结果的看法：
1）乌克兰应有权自由选择其经济和政治联盟，包括与欧洲的联盟。
2）乌克兰不应该加入北约( NATO )，这是我七年前提出的立场。
3）乌克兰应自由建立符合其人民表达意愿的任何政府。明智的乌克兰领导人会选择在他们国家不同地区之间实现和解的政策。实际上，他们应该追求一种堪比芬兰的姿态。毫无疑问，这个国家非常独立，在大多数领域都与西方合作，但却小心翼翼地避免对俄罗斯的体制性敌意。
4）俄罗斯吞并克里米亚不符合现有世界秩序的规则。但在一个不那么令人担忧的基础上处理克里米亚与乌克兰的关系应该是可能的。为此，俄罗斯将承认乌克兰对克里米亚的主权。在有国际观察员在场的情况下举行的选举中，乌克兰应该加强克里米亚的自治权。这一进程将包括消除有关塞瓦斯托波尔黑海舰队地位的任何模糊不清之处。
这些只是原则，不是药方。熟悉这一地区的人都知道，并非所有这些举措都能让各方满意。关键不在于各方绝对的满意，而是平衡不满意的各方。如果不能实现基于这些或类似条件的某种解决方案，乌克兰局势就会加速走向对抗。而这一时刻很快就会到来。
＊基辛格从 1973 年到 1977 年担任美国国务卿
本文发表于2014年3月6日《华盛顿邮报》
The Washington Post
March 6, 2014
Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.
Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.
The West must understand that, to Russia,Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet— Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.
The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.
The Ukrainians are the decisive element.They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic； the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian； the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraineas part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.
Ukraine has been independent for only 23years； it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise,even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrate that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. Awise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the dominationof a faction.
Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy；it is an alibi for the absence of one.
Putin should come to realize that,whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington.Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.
Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:
1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.
3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.
4. It is incompatible with the rules ofthe existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possibleto put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for thatwill come soon enough.
Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.